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CLOSURE AND OPENNESS: ON REALITY IN THE WORLD OF LAW* 
NIKLAS LUHMANN 
I. 
The debates about law as an autopoietic system show up a 
number of difficulties that arise when a general theory is 
transferred too directly to a limited special field. The general 
theory may be allowed simplifications, which need not be given up 
for more concrete applications, but do have to be modified. This 
is true even when, as in the case of the theory of autopoietic 
systems, one has to do with a particularly rich theory. The gain 
in wealth of ideas for very heterogeneous fields can be attained 
only through abstraction. This abstraction must be kept to in 
all applications; to do otherwise would be to abandon the theory. 
Nevertheless, possibilities must be found at the same time of 
taking account of aspects that are not susceptible of 
generalization. 
When one starts from systems theory viewpoints, this 
general problem takes on special outlines. The theory speaks of 
system and environment as if there were only one type of case. 
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True, the distinction between system and environment makes it 
clear that a solipsist position is being avoided. A system can 
reproduce itself only in an environment. If it were not 
continually irritated, stimulated, disturbed and faced with 
changes in the environment, it would after a short time terminate 
its own operations, stop its autopoiesis. But all that does is to 
remove a classical objection that even Kant no longer took too 
seriously. The question remains how the environment impinges on 
the system, and what relevance this has for the system's self-
reproduction, for the continuation of its own operations. 
If the theory of autopoietic systems speaks about self-
production or self-reproduction, this does not therefore mean that 
the system controls the totality of all causes. On the contrary, 
such a supposition would nullify the concept of production. 
Empiricists aiming at unambiguous assignments of causes may 
therefore find the statement that system and environment always 
interact causally "spongy". Thus, e.g., Rottleuthner, this 
volume: ***. On the other hand, the voluminous empirical research 
on causal attribution teaches us that in the matter of causality 
there is no way of avoiding selective judgement, and this shifts 
the question of the "essential" causes (system or environment) 
into the question of the structural conditions of the causal plan 
used. 
In this respect too the general theory of autopoietic 
systemsstill gives perceptible guidance. It first of all 
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disregards causal attributions, since this is a matter for the 
observer and can accordingly be handled differently according to 
the structure and the autopoiesis of the system being observed. 
Autopoietic closure therefore does not mean isolation; nor even 
that internal causes are more important than external ones. Such 
evaluations are left for observation of the system - and here 
external observations may differ from each other and from internal 
ones. The mere fact that the question cannot be put precisely -
what, after all, does "more important" mean? - confirms this 
thesis. 
The concept of autopoietic closure therefore initially says 
only that the recursive application of its own operations to the 
results of its own operations is an indispensable aspect of the 
system's reproduction and that this defines the unity and autonomy 
of the system. How large this own share is, from the causal point 
of view, is not prejudged thereby. The theory's direction of 
attack is towards quite other questions. 
First of all, with a comparable theoretical approach, it 
replaces Kantian premises. This has chiefly affected 
epistemological questions. Autopoietic systems need not be 
transparent to themselves. They find nothing in themselves that 
could be regarded as an undeniable fact of consciousness and 
applied as an epistemological a priori. The assumption of an a 
priori is replaced by recursivity itself. Danilo Zolo, in this 
volume: *** rightly points out that for this idea of recusiveness, 
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there are so far only biological (and one ought to add 
mathematical) descriptions, that cannot be transferred to 
rationally operating mental and social systems. This cannot 
however, rule out the search for equivalent forms in the area of 
systems of meaning, and precisely in the theory of science it is 
very easy to find countless examples of recusiveness. Scientific 
methodology is specialized specifically in exposing observation to 
observation, and eliminating whatever cannot in this sense stand 
up to an observation of observations. It may be that the 
continuing application of the operations available to the system 
to the results of precisely those operations produces stable 
states (which means states that repeat themselves in further 
operations, so-called "eigenstates"), or it may not, and depending 
·-----on the type of operation, many, or few, or only one of these self-
referentially stable states may exist. How far the system itself 
possesses reflexive capacity to observe its own states and see its 
own "identity" in them is another question. 
Another starting point is that structures of the system can 
be built up only by operations of the system. This too must take 
place in such a way as to be compatible with the system's 
autopoiesis; in the case of social systems, for instance, with 
communication. There is accordingly no input and no output of 
structures or operations of the system, and at this level, there 
are no exchange relationships with the environment. All 
structures are operationally self-specified structures of the 
system, which orients its operations to these structures. In this 
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respect too, the system is a recursively closed system. As 
presumably no one who accepts the distinction between system and 
environment will deny, it cannot operate outside its boundaries, 
in its environment; which undeniably means that the relationships 
between system and environment, as an observer can see them, 
cannot be actualized as operations of the system. The system may 
produce ideas of its own or communications of its own about its 
environment, but can never grasp and reprocess thereby everything 
that it itself presupposes as environment. (Not least for this 
reason, the environment appears to the system as a "horizon"). 
Epistemological "constructivism" concludes from this that 
what the system, at the level of its operations, regards as 
reality is a construct of the system itself. Reality assumptions 
are structures of the system that uses them. This can be 
clarified once more using the concept of recursiveness. The 
system keeps a check on the environment, operationally 
inaccessible to it, by verifying the consistency of its own 
operations, using for this a binary scheme which can record 
agreement or non-agreement. Without this form of consistency 
control, no memory could arise, and without memory there can be no 
reality (1). 
These assumptions meet with considerable resistance, 
because they contradict the reality assumptions of everyday life. 
But even disregarding this and allowing science to have its own 
peculiar theoretical formations, a theory at this level of 
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generality is not sufficient to explain the actual restrictions of 
the mode of op~ration of particular systems. It suggests, for 
instance, that autopoietic systems transform chaos into order 
(order from noise), whereas such chaos is in fact nowhere to be 
found. Even modifying this into "order from order plus noise", 
the statement remains so unspecific that not much can be done with 
it. Clearly, the obvious and trivial fact that the system cannot 
carry out any operations outside itself cannot be understood in 
such a way that the environment is a chaos for the system. 
Taking a lead from the neo-Darwinist objections to Darwin, 
this objection may also be formulated in terms of evolutionary 
theory: a system that had to start from purely random 
relationships to its environment and wait for noise or irritation 
would take much too much time to build up its own order for it to 
be capable of evolution. The rate at which complex structures are 
built up cannot be explained in this way. 
The thesis of self-referentially closed systems thus leads 
to a dilemma. On the one hand, it underlines the scarcely 
deniable fact that no system is capable of carrying out operations 
in the system's environment. Taken seriously, this explodes the 
traditional idea that the system might have some kind of access to 
a reality outside it or that the environment might be able to 
specify the structures of the system. This would caJl for special 
operations (e.g. in the sense of the classical distinction between 
sensation and reflection) which cannot be found even at the 
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neurophysiological level. On the other hand, the rate at which 
structures of complex systems are built up requires the assumption 
of a non-random, structured environment that confines the system. 
A theory of knowledge based on the theory of self-referential 
systems must be capable of resolving this dilemma and satisfying 
both requirements. 
I I. 
All systems form in a presupposed material of continuum, 
which Maturana calls medium. For example, they presuppose a 
structure of matter rooted in atoms, just as the formation of 
atoms obviously presupposes energy capable of being bound. In the 
formation of systems, then, there is never any kind of recreation 
of the world in each individual case. This material of continuum 
which has in each case to be presupposed takes no heed of the 
system boundaries of the differentiating system; it is both inside 
and outside the system. It nevertheless limits the possibilities 
of system formation, since only such systems are possible as are 
compatible with the material of continuum. 
The formation of rationally operating social systems 
already presupposes a multiplicity of such material of continua, 
and is correspondingly improbable. The physico-chemicaJ structure 
of matter must have life added, moreover in highly organized 
forms, in order to make communication possible. None of this is 
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questioned by a constructivist theory of knowledge (or only if it 
is misunderstood). On the contrary, it is only from this that the 
physical limitations on the physicist's efforts at knowledge, the 
living limitations of all human knowledge, etc., emerge, on which 
more recent materialist or biological epistemologists lay so much 
value. 
The thesis of operative closure says merely that for any 
system, only what is accessible for its own operations is 
accessible; that, therefore, for any system, only what can be 
formed as a unity through these operations can be a unity. 
This is because of the high complexity of the material of 
continuum and the necessary selectivity of all system operations. 
Thus, for instance, the human body is not a unit of life, but a 
unit of conscious perception or of communication. The individual 
cell would not, as a closed autopoietic system, be able to observe 
any unity of the body, apart from the unity of the genetic 
reproductive context, for which the organism is only a 
transitional stage in reproduction. Similarly, a person is a unit 
formed only for purposes of communication, merely a point of 
allocation and address; it is that consciousness forms its own 
autopoietic unity (not as person) (which does not exclude the 
possibility of its imagining that it is a person). 
Corporality and personality are therefore complexity 
reductions and unity syntheses, used in higher order systems in 
order to observe aspects of their material of continuum. They have 
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to do with structures of other autopoietic systems than the ones 
denoted thereby. In this sense it is quite permissible, indeed 
necessary, to put it that bodies, or persons, are what they are 
not in themselves but through observation, in accordance with the 
"laws of form" (Spencer Brown). 
For post-ontological theory formation, it is quite possible 
to assert that everything that "is" is formed through complexity 
reduction, and that the autopoietic systems in consequence form 
everything that acts as a unit for them through their own 
operations; for this in no way denies that for every system (and 
for all of them together) this complexity of their material of 
continuum exists, and to it distinctions and denotations, 
identifications and negations can be applied. 
III. 
Even these considerations are, whatever contribution they 
may be able to make towards clarifying the reality of the world of 
law, still couched very abstractly; and one is well advised always 
to abstract theoretical decisions as far as possible, in order to 
widen their sphere of application (2). Above all, we have still 
kept to speaking of a system in relation to which something is 
environment, or is material of continuum. We shall not now 
abandon this restriction, but we shall modify it, for in the case 
of law, system differentiation has to be included in the picture. 
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The legal system is a subsystem of the social system. Two system 
references tQerefore always come into play: that of society as a 
whole and that of law. 
Since law is possible only in society, every autopoietic 
operation of the legal system is always also a continuation of 
society's autopoiesis. Any transfer of normative qualifications 
from one operation to a further one is always also communication. 
The law can use neither chemical nor even merely conceptual modes 
of operation (which of course does not exclude its having chemical 
or conceptual consequences). This means on the one hand that it 
must fit in with the social limitations on possible communication, 
and therefore for instance use language correctly, or at least 
comprehensibly. On the other hand, communication is also the way 
in which society's construction of reality is mediated to the law. 
The law need not and cannot concern itself with whether particular 
words like "woman", "cylinder capacity", "inhabitant", "thallium", 
are used with sufficient consistency inside and outside the law. 
To that extent, it is supported by the network of social 
reproduction of communication by communication. Should questions 
such as whether women, etc., really exist arise, they can be 
turned aside or referred to philosophy. 
To be sure, the general physical/chemical/biological 
material of continuum must be distinguished from the special 
effects of social system differentiation (3). System 
differentiation, however, strengthens still more the assumption of 
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a continuous reality not bound up with the boundaries (in this 
case internal boundaries) of the system, which cannot be arrived 
at as a result of information processing. In this sense, the law 
participates in society's already achieved construction of 
reality, whithout having to work it out itself. It makes use of 
language and of a more or less consistent use of words inside and 
outside the legal system. 
Nevertheless, the law differentiates out within society as 
an autopoietic system on its own, by setting up a network of 
function-specific communication which in part gives words a 
narrower sense, in part a sense incomprehensible for non-legal 
communication, in part adding coinages of its own (for instance 
liability, testement), in order to make the transformations needed 
by law communicable. Whether thallium is necessary in the 
production of cement and what consequences that has is not a 
specifically legal question. It may however be the case (or else 
not) that an environmental law develops that gives this question 
additional legal relevance. Should new findings emerge in this 
area, they may have legal relevance or not - irrespective of their 
chemical or economic relevance. It is only once the legal system 
is differentiated as an operationally closed system that 
structures emerge, through the operations of this system, which 
allow and compel independent selection of aspects of the 
environment. 
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Accordingly, the fact that the legal system is dependent on 
the op~rational mode of communication and therefore willy-nilly 
takes on social preconceptions and links them up with society's 
construction of reality must be distinguished from the law's 
special cognitive operations which prepare legal decisions or 
process other legal expectations. The law can of course not 
cognitively verify all implications of its continuous 
communication, or even merely qualify them as cognition. In this 
r~spect, it may remain ill-defined, but presupposes that any 
communicatively processed assumption can be an object of cognitive 
verification, as soon as the autopoiesis of law, the processing of 
normative expectations, so requires. Whether electricity is a 
moveable within the meaning of the law becomes relevant and is 
verified when someone claims that someone else has"stolen" 
electricity. In any case, the scheme is used normatively and 
cognitively within the legal system and does not, without further 
ado, represent within the system the difference between system and 
environment too; and very frequently this schema refers the law 
back, even in cognitive questions, not to the environment, but to 
itself, and to the intended meaning of hitherto usual 
formulations. What did the system mean, or seek to exclude, in 
the formulation "moveable property of another"? 
It neve~theless remains correct to say that the cognitive 
operations guarantee the system's oppenness to the environement 
(not its relations with the environment!); and likewise, that as 
regards the function and code of the system, cognitively oriented 
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operations are secondary by comparison with the system's 
recursively closed autopoiesis. It may always be that legal norms 
or other previous decisions on which an effort at a finding is 
based prove invalid, or that other constructions of Jegal dogma 
change the approach to the issue; and then the cognitive 
operation, with its willingness to learn, immediately stops too, 
because the changing of findings (learning) would then no longer 
have any function within the system. 
Entering into this primacy of the law's normative 
autopoiesis by comparison with all claims to meaning of daily life 
is something one learns in the course of legal studies. Other 
things connected with this are the principle of the brevity of 
legal argumentation and justification of decisions, and the often 
dominating preoccupation with what has nothing to do with the 
case. 
IV. 
Further consideration of the law's reference to reality 
presupposes that there are systems that consist of nothing but 
events, that have no duration in which they can change, but 
disappear immediately on their emergence (4). Such systems 
consist, then, of unstable elements that acquire duration only by 
continually replacing disappearing elements by other ones; and by 
contrast with biological replication, these need not be the same 
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elements, but can be of a different type. A communication cannot 
be followed by the same communication, but only by a suitable 
different one. 
Since the social system (and the legal system within it) 
consists of nothing but communications, it belongs to this type of 
system that consists of events. In such cases, then, autopoiesis 
does not mean reproduction despite threat from without or despite 
natural decay of the elements. Instead, the elements are produced 
in order to end immediately, the system continually disintegrates 
itself. And the autopoiesis stops at every moment -unless 
continued. 
As far as reality references are concerned, this peculiar, 
devious system structure, oriented towards almost simultaneous 
dissolution and recreation, has a particular advantage. It can 
allow events to act simultaneously on several systems, as long as 
only their selectivity and their self-referential interweaving 
with other events always belong to different systems. Thus, 
communications are always also events in the consciousness of the 
participants (5). Nevertheless, the systems remain separate, 
because the events (which can be identified by an observer as one 
event of conscious communication) select in each case from 
different systems in relation to different other possibilities; 
this constitutes the meaning of the event in each case. That the 
elementary operations have the character of events can guarantee a 
high degree of interpenetration of the various systems, 
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preventing, through the disappearence of the events, the systems 
from becoming stuck to one another. Thus, albeit in extremely 
precarious form, especially close relationships between system and 
environment can be produced. The transience of the "material" is 
exploited in two ways; for the reproduction of the system and for 
the interpenetration of system and environment. 
While this type of linkage between system and environment 
is brought about almost obligatorily in the relationship between 
social system and consciousness, the twofold membership of events 
in various systems can also exist within society, albeit more 
occasionally. An act of payment is economically relevant, but may 
also take place in fulfilment of a legal obligation. An act of 
legislation has political meaning, and if legally valid, 
simultaneously brings about a structural change in the legal 
system. Here again it is true that any system can constitute the 
event as an element of its own through self-referential reference 
to other operations of its own system; at the same time, an 
observer uninterested in the sharper distinctions can in each case 
see an event of economic law or political law respectively. The 
networks of communication and the selective pattern of the 
definition of the elements in each case remain different; at the 
same time, however, on the basis of the participation on all sides 
in social communication, it is clear that the legal system could 
not treat a payment as a payment, were it not a payment in the 
economic system; just as the political system could not see a law 
as proof of success of political activity, or combat it as an 
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opposition, if the legal system were to treat the law not as a 
law, but, say~ as a legally irrelevant expression of opinion by 
certain politicians. 
One might go on to imagine examples of a much looser 
linkage, in which even an external observer would have trouble in 
relating the twofold membership to a definable event. Attendance 
at school is compliance with the legal obligation, but learning 
cannot be legally required. The purchase of Christmas presents 
may be an event within the system of the family that is not 
perceivable as such in the shop, and only rarely throws up legal 
problems - if, for instance, the present has been chosen in such a 
way as to amount to grounds for divorce. 
In any case, whether tightly or loosely coupled, this 
reality mediation through events has to be distinguished from what 
the systems involved process as information, Information is 
always selection exclusively within the system - conditioned by 
the selective approach used within the system. It is therefore 
neither possible nor necessary for the simultaneous presence of 
events in several systems to be used by the latter as information. 
Correspondingly, the surprise value of one and the same event 
differs in different systems. The now notorious practice of party 
contributions was a surprise only for the legal system, while the 
political system was surprised only by the fact that the legal 
system was surprised thereby and the economy continues to 
attribute no significant informational value to such slight sums. 
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As long as it is a case of information, i.e. of selection 
from a range of equally possible other events or non-events, every 
system is dependent on itself, and this is true for the 
informational value of operations carried out by itself as it is 
for that attached by the system to events that it assigns not to 
itself but to the environment. For information is nothing other 
than a component of communication, and thus an aspect of internal 
autopoietic operation, and its cognitive structures are based on 
the internal representation of this difference between system and 
environment within the system. 
The distinction offered here between linkage to environment 
through material of continua and through simultaneous presence of 
events, on the one hand, and information processing on the other, 
solves a problem that has been exercising minds since the age of 
scepticism. On the one hand, the system his available only its 
own mode of operation and only information processing using its 
own operations. Everything the system determines about reality in 
this way remains subject to its own operations and therefore 
negatable. In the system, therefore, certainty as to reality can 
be reached only through recursive application of its own 
operations to the results of its own operations, i.e. only by 
second-order cybernetics, and by eigenstates in Heinz von 
Foerster's sense. On the other hand, the system has to be 
supported in carrying out its own operations by material of 
continua. It does not have sufficient "requisite variety" to be 
able to reconstruct everything that exists within itself as 
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information (6). The legal system especially must be able to base 
itself on the general possibilities of communicative interaction 
(and therefore on its own sociality) as well as on multiple 
membership of events in systems; since otherwise it would go from 
hundredths to thousandths and ultimately have to treat every event 
as a selection of one world-state from all other possible world-
states. 
Scepticism was right in its view that the certainty of 
living in a really existing world could never be expected as the 
result of information processing. The equally well-known 
counterargument that this view cannot be consistently advocated 
does not, however, lead back to pre-scepticism certainty of 
reality. It only indicates that consistency checks within the the 
system, whereby its own operations are referred to the results of 
its own operations, are used within the system as a reality 
indicator, and that this is enough if the system also possesses 
the distinction between self-reference and outside reference and 
is thereby able to differentiate the consistency checks according 
to whether it assigns the selection of information to itself or to 
the environment. 
That this procedure already presupposes reality is easy to 
see for an observer; but the autopoiesis of the observing system 
operates under precisely the same restrictions, thus likewise 
processes only its own information. For the system itself the 
same state of affairs appears, quite marginally and as it were out 
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from t he fact that any information of the corner of an eye, 
;ng presupposes a reduction of complexity. process. Thus, the legal 
treat a payment, according to the circumstances, as system may 
fulfilment of contract, tax evasion, bankruptcy offence etc. - but 
not as wearing out banknotes or as power consumption by a 
f ;ctional dealing with a reality invented by the computer, nor as • 
economic system. Communicatively and as far as events are 
concerned, it can take the payment for granted as "what is 
understood thereby". 
V. 
If all this is presupposed, the concept of autonomy of the 
system can be freed from traditional assumptions and redefined. 
not mean hav ing a large share in the causes of Autonomy then, does 
one's own operations or of the continued existence of the system -
an idea that would compel weakening the concept in the direction 
of "relative autonomy" and obscure any clear boundary between 
autonomy and non-autonomy (7). 
But autonomy does not, either, simply mean self-regulation 
or self-organization with given interdependencies of system and 
environment. This may of course be accepted as a provisional 
conceptualization, more useful than the one concentrating on 
causality; but it neglects the fact that the system has, in order 
to regulate its operations, to use precisely the type of 
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operations that regulate it. Law-making and law applying 
operations cannot be distinguished in principle, even if the sytem 
itself has institutionalized this difference. Autonomy in the 
sense of self-regulation would, then, mean nothing other than 
institutionalization of the difference between rule-formation and 
rule-application in the system. However, this merely leads back 
to the question how the system is then in a position to set up 
such a difference. This question can be answered using the 
concept of operational autonomy. 
From the genetic point of view, autonomy is thereby to be 
reduced to the fact that operations can be linked with operations 
only selectively, and that recusive applications of operations to 
results of operations therefore inevitably, if they occur, lead to 
the differentiation of systems. Such systems are then autonomous 
at a basal level, since they can reach forwards or backwards to 
operations of their own in order to produce operations of their 
own. 
The obverse of this autonomy is that the corresponding 
conditions can neither be taken from the environment as input or 
given to it as output, i.e. cannot be exchanged. Thus, the legal 
quality (whether validity or invalidity) of claims and decisions 
can be derived only from other operations of the same system (for 
instance, by reference to statutes or to precedents or to such 
dubious recourses as "prevailing opinion"); it cannot be supplied 
from external sources like religion or politics or the economy; 
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and if in the legal system such references to external sources can 
be found, then these references are in turn already legal norms, 
which legally legitimate block acceptance of external norms or 
decisions (of good morals, say, or sound management, or the 
majority decisions of political processes). Any other view would 
have the problem of explaining how law and morals, rules of sound 
management, etc. could then be distinguished. 
While for the emergence of the autonomy of the social 
system it is enough to have communication that is ultimately 
constituted by the distinction of information and communication of 
information (8), functional systems like the legal system are 
dependent on particular codings (9). Accordingly, law emerges 
only if, and only in so far as, the need is communicated to 
distinguish between (legal) right and wrong. It is only under 
this condition of split self-reference that operational 
recursivity takes on the form of right -~ not wrong -i right 
(instead of :right-~ right -7 right). It is only this that 
equips the legal system for ~nternal consistency checking; and it 
is only in that way that wrong conclusions from right to right 
(e.g. from the lawful purchase of a car to permission to drive) 
can be avoided. Only this intermediate check of whether right 
need not perhaps be wrong prevents the law from legitimating too 
many expectations which cannot then any longer be brought into a 
complementary order. 
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As for autopoiesis in general, it can also be said about 
autonomy that. it either exists or does not. It cannot be realized 
a little bit, or only relatively (compared with what?). All that 
is relativizable is the degree of differentiation of the system 
according to the quantity and nature of the operations that it can 
carry out. The struggles for "autonomy" of the law against 
theological and political tutelage, against the non-justiciability 
of church matters, against the linking of legal dogma to 
theological appropriateness, against royal interference etc. are 
(in so far as this is all not just liberal legend-making) to be 
understood as processes of the law's increased differentiation, 
i.e. as aspects of the historical transition to a functional 
differentiation of the social system, ending ultimately in the 
universality of the legal system's functional competence. 
It has just as little sense to fear a loss of the law's 
autonomy if political forces, or economic interests, are impinging 
more on the law. The instruments of this influence -
parliamentary legislation and contractual freedom - were, not by 
chance, created at a time at which the desirability and the 
reality of the law's autonomy were beyond question. This 
historical connection between the law's differentiation and the 
instrumentalization of the possibilities of using it shows 
sufficiently clearly that the point is an increase in the law's 
autonomy and dependency in relation to its social environment, 
i.e., its differentiation. Seen as social implementation of a 
claim for autonomy, the process would be paradoxical; for that 
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would mean that the autonomy was to be guaranteed by surrendering 
the arbitrary power of restricting it. 
The law's autonomy is in danger only when the code itself 
is in danger - for instance when decisions are taken in the legal 
system itself increasingly according to the difference between 
beneficial and harmful rather than the difference between right 
and wrong. Tendencies of this nature can be found. They have been 
promoted by interest-group case law and by "social engineering" 
doctrines. In limiting cases one may reach the point when the 
anti-trust courts can no longer be distinguished from the anti-
trust office, or youth courts from the youth welfare office itself 
(or only as part of an organizational sequence of proceedings). 
It is precisely when one wishes to observe and describe such 
developments that crystal-clear conceptualization is important. 
And precisely in practical questions, it will be of little use 
concentrating on more or less influence, and defining the bottle 
as half full or half empty according to one's initial 
expectations. 
VI. 
All this does not yet answer the question of how correct 
the theory of autopoietic systems is to take it that its 
assumption that there are autopoietic systems corresponds to 
reality. Danilo Zolo even thinks that he has discovered a crass 
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contradiction here, namely the introduction of "metaphysical" 
premises into constructavist theory (10). This is, however, a 
misunderstanding, and again a crass one, of the whole theoretical 
position; and the misunderstanding shows how hard it is really to 
apply the idea of self-reference as fundamental and to stick to 
that decision. 
If social systems as such, and therefore science also as a 
social system, are autopoietic systems, then all the assumptions 
developed for law, society and other social systems apply also to 
science, to sociology and to the communicative context of a theory 
of autopoietic systems. The discoveries of this theories must be 
applied to the theory itself, and they can be applied to the 
theory. The theory would indeed contradict itself were it to 
claim for itself an exceptional position, with privileged access 
to "external reality". This is, however, neither meaningful nor 
needful. The constructions of the theory are applied in all 
consistency to the theory and to its communicative context too. 
The statement that "there exist autopoietic systems" then means 
nothing other than that the reality construction of the theory of 
autopoietic systems takes off from this assumption. It does not 
form "merely analytical" concepts which bring in a difference 
between analytical and real situations, but through its constructs 
deals directly with what is reality for it. And the test lies 
ultimately in the recursiveness (doubted by Zolo), namely in the 
insight that this works even though the theory itself compels 
self-reference. 
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Perhaps this is "meta"-physics, at any rate a 
universalistic position that allows no exception. But the point 
is no longer ontology, since it is no longer assumed that there 
exist in the world (or outside the world) positions from which the 
world can be correctly (or perhaps falsely) described as it is. 
Such positions consistently end up with cancelling out the 
observer; for if he observes correctly he sees only what is the 
case, and therefore adds nothing of his own, and if he observes 
wrongly, his observation is worthless for that reason alone (ll). 
The new natural (or material, biological, sociological or in any 
case empirical) epistemologies differ in principle from 
traditional epistemologies by presupposing the observer's own 
contribution, inseparably bound up with his system structures, his 
autopoiesis, his instrumentation as a condition of knowledge. The 
thesis of the recursive closure of all cognition draws a radical 
consequence from this (already widespread) post-ontological 
epistemology. If it is rejected as untenable, then the question 
arises whether an observer's own contribution can be construed 
otherwise (and perhaps better) - or whether the assertion is 
ventured that there is after all a privileged (and therefore 
negative!) place for observing the world. And that would have to 
be the place of the person making that assertion. 
NOTES 
1. Heinz von Foerster further shows that memory is nothing but 
this consistency check, and is therefore to be understood as an 
undistinguishable aspect of all cognitive operations (and not, 
say, as a kind of "store", where with a bit of luck something may 
be found). See: What is Memory that it May have Hindsight and 
Foresight as well?, in: Samuel Bogoch (ed.), The Future of the 
Brain Sciences, New York, 1969: 19-64, and specifically, on the 
need for binarization: "Self-reference enters the system through 
two channels, one via a priori established "good" or "bad" 
signals (+) (-) that report the consequences of an action; the 
other one via the loop (A) -~ (A+) -7 A or, mutatis mutandis, via 
corresponding other loops that report the state of its own 
actions" (p. 35). On this cf. also Ladeur in this volume, *** 
2. As can be easily seen, this rule clashes with the usage of 
applying theories in a manner specific to a discipline, and 
meeting any analogy to situations outside the system with 
mistrust. 
3. This was pointed out to me (orally) by Gunther Teubner. 
(See also Social order from Legislative Noise? :***). I have not 
however followed his suggestion to stop, for that reason, calling 
the densified connections within differentiated systems "material 
of continuum~'. 
4. There is no intention to deny that this takes a certain 
time and to that extent presupposes duration in the sense of a 
"specious present". The decisive point is that the event has no 
duration in which it could change, since this would amount to 
breaking up the event into smaller events. 
5. Not always of all participants. It may very well be that 
one of them experiences as communication something that the other 
did not mean as communication. 
6. If this is true, it is hard to see how systems of 
interaction between autopoietic systems can emerge to which the 
same limitation of requisite variety does not apply equally or 
even more narrowly. Systems formed among systems can (precisely 
because of their extremely limited capacity) be important for 
handling conflict, but not as a way of confrontation of systems 
with reality. On this cf. also Gunther Teubner, Social Order from 
Legislative Noise?, ***, and Michael Hutter, How the Economy Talks 
the Law into "eo-Evolution", ***, on "conversation circles". 
7. If this concept is recommended by Richard Lempert (this 
volume ***) as especially suitable for empirical research, this 
unclarity as to "how much" would have to be removed by further 
indications; and considering the well-known problems of causal 
attribution, it is hard to see immediately how this can be done. 
8. For more detail see Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme: 
Grundrii einer allgemeinen Theorie, Frankfurt, 1984: *** 
9. The fundamental importance of binarization of self-
reference for the differentiation of systems arises from the need 
for discriminiative capacity in the linkage of operations. 
Binarity is the simplest, quickest and therefore evolutionarily 
the fittest form for this; see also Note l. above. 
10. Lo statuto epistemolgico ... in this volume *** 
ll. Thus, e.g. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et 
!'invisible,, Paris, 1964, who, starting from these considerations 
and taking up from Husserl's late philosophy, puts the human body 
in the position of an epistemological a priori; also, with 
remarkable coincidences in the formal analysis, Gotthard Genther, 
Beitrage zur Grundlegung einer operationsfahigen Dialektik, 3 
Vols., Hamburg, 1976: 80. 
